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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN J. BLOOMER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 920400-CA
vs.
KIM EDWARD, KIM EDWARD CONOVER
and KAREN JANE CONOVER, a Utah
General Partnership dba K & K
SALES; and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY, a corporation,

Oral Argument Priority 16

Defendants-Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court
and was within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992) . The
case was transferred by the Supreme Court to this court, and
jurisdiction is conferred on this court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does the evidence support the trial court's finding that

defendant Kim Conover made false statements to plaintiff with
intent to deceive? Appellate review is under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v, Neale. 783 P.2d 551,
553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

2.

Is trial court's finding that plaintiff suffered a loss,

and that the vehicle was defective and unsafe at the time she
purchased it, supported by the evidence? Appellate review is under
a "clearly erroneous" standard.
3.

Id.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering

rescission of the transaction, even though the statute contemplates
and the parties requested an award of damages? The judgment should
be affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion.

See

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
4.

In ordering rescission, did the trial court abuse its

discretion in failing to give defendants a specific credit for the
use plaintiff had made of the vehicle?

The judgment should be

affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion.

Dugan v.

Jones. 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986).
5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion is awarding

Plaintiff her attorney fees without requiring allocation to each
alleged theory plead in the complaint?

The judgment should be

affirmed unless Defendants have shown an abuse of discretion.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)
6.

Is Plaintiff entitled to recover her attorney fees on

appeal.

This is an original request addressed to the sound

discretion of this Court.

See Management Services Corp. v.

Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (Supp. 1992) and § 13-11-19 (1986)
are reproduced in the appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is a civil action brought in

the district court, seeking relief for damages relating to the sale
of a used automobile.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.

Plaintiff filed her action on November 3, 1989 (R. 2-11.)
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 10, 1991. (R.
110-21.)

Defendants answered on April 29, 1991 (R. 122-23.), and

amended their answer on July 1, 1991.

(R. 134.)

The case was tried to the court on September 3 and 4, 1991.
(R. 136-38.)
Defendants

By direction of the trial court and stipulation of
(R. 509-10),

Plaintiff

attorney fees by affidavit.

submitted

evidence

of her

(R. 140-72, 197-202.)

On September 12, 1992, Defendants filed a "Motion for More
Definite Statement Re Attorneys Fees and Order of Court to Require
Plaintiff, Insofar as Possible to Restore Defendant to Status Quo."
(R. 173-76.)

Plaintiff responded to the motion.

(R. 225-31.)

On October 1, 1992, Plaintiff served a form of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 232-29) and a form of Judgment (R.
240-42) on Defendants.

Defendants objected to the proposals (R.

203-07) and Plaintiff responded to the objections. (R. 219-22.) On

3

November 4, the trial court signed and entered the findings and
judgment submitted by Plaintiff.

(R. 232-29, 240-42.)

On December 20, 1992, Defendants filed a second document (R.
243-45) containing objections to Plaintiff's proposed findings and
judgment, even though the findings and judgment had already been
entered by the trial court.1

This second round of objections was

argued orally to the trial court on December 31, 1991.

The court

modified some of its findings, and ordered that any appeal could
run from the date of the modified findings and conclusions.

(R.

267.) An order formally vacating the findings and conclusions and
judgment was entered March 4, 1992 (R. 316-18), after the Notice of
Appeal had been filed.

(R. 296-97.)

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 268-75)
and an Amended Judgment (R. 276-79) were entered January 23, 1992.2
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on February 19, 1992. (R.
296-97.) Defendants have posted a bond to stay enforcement of the
judgment pending this appeal.

(R. 329-30.)

*Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, requires
that objections to proposed findings be submitted within five days
after service. The proper method to object to a document which has
already been entered is to serve a motion under either Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(b) or 59. Such motions must be served within 10 days of
entry of judgment, and in this case should have been served no
later than November 14, 1991.
2

A second version of the Amended Judgment, which contained
blanks for the judgments for attorney fees and costs, was entered
on March 4, 1992. (R. 312-15.) It is evident that this later
document was entered in error, as the earlier document (R. 276-79)
is in the same form but has the blanks filled in.
4

C.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff purchased a 1986 Nissan Sentra automobile from Kim
Conover on April 19, 1988.

Mr. Conover, a licensed automobile

dealer, together with his wife, operated a business known as K & K
Sales, and had purchased the vehicle from Western Affiliated
Salvage.

(R. 407.) The business engaged in the purchase, repair,

and sale of used automobiles, and Mr. Conover had regularly
purchased automobiles from the salvage yard. (R. 408.) The vehicle
sold to Plaintiff had been wrecked and declared a total loss by the
insurance company. (R. 408.)
Mr. Conover employed David Gray to perform some specific
repairs to the vehicle, using used parts acquired by Mr. Conover.
Mr. Gray recommended that the apron be replaced because it had been
seriously damaged, and such frame parts lose their strength after
being damaged that severely.

(R. 490.)

Mr. Conover instructed

against making the necessary repair, and instead instructed Mr.
Gray to simply square the apron as best he could. (R. 488.)

Mr.

Conover performed additional repairs himself on the vehicle's
suspension.

fid.)

Consistent with his past practice

(R. 409), Mr. Conover

advertised the car for sale in the newspaper.
did

not disclose

The advertisement

that Mr. Conover was a dealer.

(R. 383.)

Plaintiff answered the advertisement in early April, 1988, and
went, with her husband, to Mr. Conover's residence to look at the
car.

(R. 373.) Plaintiff asked Mr. Conover why he was selling the
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car, and he answered that "they had several vehicles, and that his
wife was pregnant and they needed another car."
Conover mentioned

that he might

(R. 374.)

be interested

Mr.

in purchasing

Plaintiff's Ford Escort, stating that the reason for his interest
was that "it would attach to the motor home and he could use it to
tow it, use it for an extra vehicle."

(R. 375.)

He did not

disclose that he was a car dealer nor that he was in the business
of repairing wrecked automobiles and selling them.

(R. 375.)

Plaintiff looked around for about two weeks, and ultimately
notified Mr. Conover that she wanted to buy the car.

(R. 374-75.)

On April 19, 1988, she gave him a check for $6,375.00, representing
the difference between the value of the Escort and the asking price
of the Nissan, and another check for $30.00 for the taxes on the
Escort. (R. 375-76.)

During the transaction, Mr. Conover stated

that he was an RV dealer and could thus facilitate the transfer of
title and related paper work.

(R. 379.)

that he was a [car] dealer, as such."
Following

the

payment,

Mr.

He "never did mention

fid.)

Conover

for

the

first

time

partially disclosed the prior damage to the car, but stated only
that "the car had, at one point, the right front fender bent and he
had replaced that and the right front headlight."

(R. 377-78.)

Mr. Conover did not disclose that the car had been totaled in a
wreck.

(R. 378.)

About six months after the purchase, Plaintiff and her husband
took the Nissan on a trip to Flagstaff, Arizona, for a family
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wedding on October 22, 1988.

Plaintiff's husband did some of the

driving during the trip, and told Plaintiff the car badly need a
wheel alignment.

(R. 382.) Plaintiff also began to notice that as

she "would go to either accelerate or decelerate, it would tug just
slightly to one side . . . ."

(Id.)

Within a week of returning from Flagstaff, Plaintiff took the
car to a tire store to have the wheels aligned.

(R. 382.)

It

worked better for a day or two, but then the same problem returned,
so she returned to the tire store and had the car realigned, fid.)
The problem still wasn't fixed, so she took the car to another tire
store, but with no greater success. She purchased and installed a
total of six new tires in an effort to correct the problem and
because of the abnormal wear on the tires.

(R. 384.)

paid $491.88 to the tire store for the repairs and tires.

Plaintiff
(R. 388,

exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5.)
During one the visits, the tire store determined that one of
the ball joints had been installed incorrectly, and replaced it.
(R. 466.) While replacing the ball joint, the mechanic discovered
the frame was cracked.

(R. 467.)

Plaintiff then took her car to

a Nissan dealer, who advised her the vehicle was unsafe to drive.
(R. 386-87, exhibit P-7.) Plaintiff ultimately took the car to Les
Jensen's Collision Repair. The mechanic, Ed Jensen, determined the
vehicle had been subjected to a "fairly decent" side impact to the
right front wheel (R. 475), and had been improperly repaired:
Q
[Mr. Martineau] Now, let me ask you
this: Was the part or parts of this vehicle
7

that were damaged in the collision part of or
units of the unibody construction?
A

[Ed Jensen]

Critical units.

Q

What were they, which were they?

A
The right front side member—there
are numerous pieces of a car that the manufacturer will build and sell to auto body
facilities to replace. The right front frame
member, there are things like baffles, reinforcements, isolated pieces that go on that,
so you weld these together in a puzzle type
situation.
The front side member of the
vehicle that holds the fender and actually
holds to the cowl and welds to the frame, all
of these pieces, in my opinion, should have
been replaced.
Q

Were they?

A

They had never been replaced.

Q

They had not been replaced?

A

No.

Q

What had been done with them?

A
Well, they had been pulled, and I
guess to some degree aligned to fit back in
the rough configuration with the way the car
should have been. There had been welds made.
There had also been holes cut in some of the
members that wouldn't have been there before.
More or less, weakening the structure.
(R. 477.)
Mr. Jensen concluded the car was unsafe to drive (R. 484) and
advised Plaintiff not to drive it.

(R. 473.)

Plaintiff commenced

this action soon after to obtain appropriate relief
defective and dangerous condition of the car.

8

for the

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
This appeal predominately challenges the trial court's factual
findings, but Defendants' brief does not properly marshal the
evidence in support of the findings.

The evidence supports the

findings that Kim Conover, a car dealer, purchased a wrecked
automobile with the intent of repairing and reselling it, but that
he sold it to Plaintiff under the pretence of being a private
individual selling a family car.

The evidence further shows that

Mr. Conover took Plaintiff's car as a trade under the pretence that
he would use it personally, although his real intent was to try to
resell it to a university student. Mr. Conover failed to disclose
that he was a dealer, and affirmatively tried to create the
opposite impression, and failed to disclose that the car had been
wrecked and improperly repaired. The evidence supports the finding
of violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The evidence further supports the finding that the damage to
Plaintiff's car existed
Defendants.

from the time she purchased

it from

Plaintiff suffered a loss.

Although not requested by the parties, the restitution order
made by the trial court was fair and was within the court's
discretion.

The court was not required, under the facts of this

case, to use mathematical precision in returning the parties to the
status quo.
The trial court properly awarded Plaintiff her attorney fees
because Plaintiff was the prevailing
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party.

The

fact that

Plaintiff did not prevail on each alternative theory she had
pleaded is irrelevant.
Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below, and is entitled to
an award of fees on this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURTS FINDINGS OF A VIOLATION OF TWO
SECTIONS OF THE DECEPTIVE PRACTICES ACT ARE
AMPLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL.
Defendants claim the evidence did not support the trial
court's finding that Kim Conover made false statements to Plaintiff
with intent to deceive.

The proper procedure for presenting such

a claim, and the standard of appellate review, are set forth in
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989):
In order to challenge a trial court's findings
of fact, a party "must marshal the evidence in
support
of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Id. at 553 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Defendants have not marshalled the evidence in support of the
findings. The Mountain States court continued:

"Appellants often

overlook or disregard this heavy burden. When the duty to marshall
is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Id.
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(citations omitted).

Besides failing to marshall the evidence,

Defendants have also failed to present a "statement of the issues
presented for review and the standard of appellate review for each
issue with supporting authority for each issue." Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5) (emphasis added).

Because Defendants have not complied

with these rules, this Court should decline to consider Defendants'
arguments. Utah R. App. P. 24(k); Mountain States, supra, 783 P.2d
at 553.
While is it not appellee's burden to marshall and discuss the
evidence, a review of the court's findings and the supporting
evidence demonstrates that the court's decision was not clearly
erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52, and is fully
supported by the evidence.
Defendants

first

challenge

the

finding

that

Defendants

violated Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4(c) (Supp. 1992), which states
that a supplier

commits

a deceptive act or practice

if the

supplier, with intent to deceive, "indicates that the subject of a
consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has been
used to an extent that is materially different from the fact."
(emphasis supplied).

The court stated from the bench:

I am finding there is a violation of Section
13-11-4(c) making it unlawful for a sellar
[sic] or supplier to indicate that the subject
of the consumer transaction is new, or unused,
if it is not, or has been used to an extent
that is materially different from the fact.
I think the fact that the car was totally
demolished almost, or was at least totalled
out by the insurance company, is a material
11

fact that was different from the way that it
had be [sic] represented to the plaintiff, and
I think that that section was violated.
(R. 588.)

The Court further clarified its ruling in written form

in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
January 23, 1992.

A somewhat lengthy citation to those written

findings makes the trial court's decision regarding § 13-11-4(c)
(Supp. 1992) clear.
9. . . . K & K Sales became fully aware,
and was charged with full notice, of the fact
that the subject vehicle had been severely
damaged in an automobile accident to such an
extent that the subject vehicle had been
affiliated as a salvage vehicle.
10. Subsequent to October 12, 1987, K &
K Sales made or caused to be made, certain
repairs to the subject vehicle.
11. On or about April 19, 1988, K & K
Sales, acting through Conover as its duly
authorized agent, sold and conveyed the subject vehicle to plaintiff and in connection
therewith, K & K Sales and Conover, with
intent to deceive plaintiff, represented to
plaintiff that the subject vehicle was a low
mileage vehicle, that it had been repaired
following an accident in which it had been
involved, whereby it had only sustained damage
to one of its front fenders, that the subject
vehicle was in good condition and state of
repair, that it could be operated safely, and
that it was reasonable fit and fully operable
for its intended use.
12. At the time K & K Sales and Conover
sold the subject vehicle to plaintiff, K & K
Sales and Conover knew and were charged with
full knowledge (a) that the subject vehicle
had sustained severe structural damage in the
aforementioned accident, (b) that unless such
damage had been properly and professionally
repaired, the subject vehicle could not be
operated safely and without the same consti12

tuting a severe hazard to its operator and the
public at large, and (c) that the value of the
subject vehicle, if not properly so repaired,
would be but a fraction of the value of the
subject vehicle had the aforementioned representations been true,
13. Plaintiff, in reasonably [sic] and
foreseeable reliance upon the aforementioned
representations and without knowledge of their
falsity, purchased the subject vehicle.
14. Subsequent to plaintiff's purchase
of the subject vehicle, plaintiff learned and
became aware of the fact that K & K Sales and
Conover had made or caused to be made certain
repairs to the subject vehicle.
15. The aforementioned acts and breaches
of duty on the part of K & K Sales and Conover
constituted deceptive and unconscionable acts
and practices under 5 13-11-4 and 13-11-5 of
the Sales Practices Act.
R. 306-08.
Each

of

these

findings

is

supported

by

the

evidence.

Defendants do not challenge any finding specifically, but instead
level a general charge that there was no evidence that Kim Conover
misrepresented the condition of the automobile, nor that he had an
intent to deceive.
Mr. Conover's testimony indicates that he was aware that the
subject vehicle had been totalled.

"Q. Did you understand it had

been totalled by the insurance company?"

A.

"Yes, I understood

the insurance company paid off a claim against this particular
vehicle."

(R. 408.)

Marilyn Bloomer testified that at no time

before the sale was there any mention of the fact that the car had
been in any type of an accident, but that after the transaction had
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been finished and as she was leaving, Mr. Conover indicated that
the right front fender had been bent and replaced and the headlight
had also been replaced.

No indication was made that the car had

been totalled, that it had had any major repair work done or any
other indication of its diminished value.

(R. 377-78.)

This

testimony regarding Mr. Conover's failure to mention in any way
before the sale the extensive damage and repairs made to the
vehicle, coupled with his later misrepresentation as to the extent
of that damage, is more than sufficient to uphold the trial court,s
ruling that Mr. Conover made misrepresentations as to the value of
the vehicle and represented it had been "used to an extent that is
materially different from the fact."3
Further evidence on the question of disclosure also supports
the trial court's finding of non-disclosure. Mr. Conover testified
that he had never met Joseph Bloomer, Marilyn Bloomer's husband.
Q
Who was in the car when she took the
test drive?
A
We had Ann Prosence with us, I
believe. Yeah.
Q
Ann Prosence. And who drove it?
A
Marilyn drove the car.
Q
And which seat were you in?
A
I think I was setting in the back
seat, but I can't recall, it has been over
three years ago.
Q
Could it have been her husband in
the front seat?
A
No. Never met her husband.
Q
Was the condition with [sic] the
Nissan discussed by you?
3

This is particularly true in light of Rule 52 (a) 's
requirement that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
14

A

Yes, it was.

(R. 414.) Yet, this testimony is directly contradicted by that of
Joseph Bloomer where he indicated:
Q
Are you acquainted with Kim Conover?
A
Yes.
Q
Could you relate the circumstances
under which you became acquainted with Mr.
Conover?
A
When my wife and I went to look at cars,
we went to his home. I drove the little
Escort we had up to the home, and we was
looking for the address. And when we got
there, Marilyn went to the door, and he
came out, and we looked at the car. And
so he wanted to know if we wanted to take
a ride in it, and Marilyn got in the
driver's side, I got in the right hand
front seat, and Mr. Conover got in the
back seat.
Q
So you rode in the Nissan on that
occasion?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Was this before or on the date that
Marilyn bought the vehicle?
A
Before.
Q
How long before?
A
Couple days, probably.
Q
Would it have been a couple of
weeks?
A
It might have. I'm not real positive on that exactly when she got the car.
Q
Do you remember having been a party
to any discussion with Mr. Conover on that
occasion?
A
Other than it was a family car.
They wanted to get rid of it. He said his
wife was pregnant and they needed something
larger.
Q
Was anything said about the vehicle
having been damaged?
A
No.
Q
Was anything said about the price?
A
Not then. No.
Q
Not at that time?
A
No.

15

(R. 498.)

He then further testified that he would have wanted to

look inside and out of the car if he had been told it had been hit.
(R. 499.)

It is apparent that the trial court chose to credit

Marilyn and Joseph Bloomer's testimony over that of Kim Conover.
Such a decision was an appropriate use of the trial court's
discretion as the ultimate factfinder, and gives no cause on appeal
for a reversal or modification.
Defendants' next assertion on appeal is that defendant made no
statement with the "intent to deceive," and that "the evidence was
that he had every right to believe the subject vehicle was in safe
condition."

Brief of Appellant at 7.

This claim is untenable.

Extensive and consistent testimony at trial indicated that the
repairs were done in slip shod fashion and that Kim Conover knew
that additional repairs were needed.

David Grey, the mechanic who

did the original repairs on the vehicle, stated that he did only
$930.00 worth of repairs.

(R. 489.) The repairs were specifically

dictated by Mr. Conover, rather than by what the vehicle needed.
(R. 486-87, 489.)

For example, Mr. Gray believed that the apron

panel should be replaced, and so informed Mr. Conover.
89.)

(R. 488-

Mr. Conover was apparently unable to locate a used apron

panel, and requested that Mr. Gray "just go ahead and square it up,
you know, the best as possible."

(R. 488.)

Mr. Gray further testified that if the vehicle had been
intended for his own personal use, he would have "replaced a lot
more parts."

He explained that the frame parts, such as the apron
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panel, "lose their strength after they have been damaged that
severe."

(R. 490.

See also R. 493.)

Ed Jensen, a man who has spent his entire life in the autobody
industry, testified even more forcefully as to the poor quality of
the repairs. He first testified that he would consider the repairs
to be "marginal."

(R. 472.)

He further testified that "it was

obvious that something was wrong, had been repaired improperly.
And if she was having that much trouble as they had described to
me, I suggested they didn't drive it any further . . . ."

Id. He

then testified that "I moved the wheel back and forth, which
indicated there were major problems, either something lost or one
thing or another."

And that if there had been nothing wrong the

wheel would not have moved freely in that fashion.4

(R. 474.)

He

then testified "And then, of course, we noted that there were
improper repairs done to the car. Repairs that were very obviously
not —

oh, wouldn't be kosher with manufacturing processing of

returning the car to its pre-collision condition."

(R. 475.)

Then, discussing trial exhibit P-6, he expressed his opinion that
that list of repairs should have been made to make the car safe.
(R. 478.) He finished his testimony by stating that "there were no
signs of damage to the vehicle other than that what had been
repaired" (R. 482), thereby rebutting the defense inference that
the damage had occurred after the sale.
4

Examining this extensive

Mervin Brown, a front-end mechanic for Big-0 Tire in
Centerville, testified that a ball joint had been installed
incorrectly. (R. 466.)
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testimony in light of the fact that appellant did much of the work
himself, and the fact that a safety inspection does not check for
these kinds of latent defects, it is clear the trial court had
ample evidence in the record to support its decision.
Defendants

also

challenges

the

finding

that

Defendants

violated Section 13-11-4 (d) , which states that ,fa supplier commits
a deceptive act or practice, if the supplier, with intent to
deceive:
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction is available to the consumer for a
reason that does not exist[.]
Defendants' sparse argument (slightly less than a full page)
makes no serious attempt to marshall the evidence and merely
asserts that Mrs. Bloomer was aware that appellant was a dealer.
Appellants' Brief at 8-9.

Appellant fails to address both the

court's actual ruling and the underlying rationale supporting that
ruling.

The court's oral ruling indicates that the court found a

violation of Section 13-11-4(d) because Mr. Conover represented he
wished to sell the car because of a family decision, when in fact
he was selling it as a dealer. The more specific language is thus:
Also Section D, making it unlawful for the
supplier to indicate that the subject of the
consumer transaction is available to the
consumer for a reason that does not exist, I
believe the evidence in this case, as I say,
it would indicate that Mr. Conover indicated
that the reason that he wanted to sell it was
because it was a family car. His wife was
pregnant. He needed to get rid of it. For
that reasons, all those things were technically true. The fact he is a dealer in automobiles, was in the business of repairing them
18

and selling them, that was not disclosed to
plaintiff, I think that is a violation of
section D.
(R. 588.

See also R. 597.)

Careful reading of this language

indicates that while the facts Mr. Conover stated were "technically
true," the court felt that the actual reason for which Mr. Conover
was letting the car out for sale was that he was a dealer in those
automobiles and was simply seeking to make a profit.
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Mr. Conover never told
Marilyn Bloomer that he was a dealer in used automobiles, only that
he dealt in recreational vehicles.
Q
Up to this time, were you aware that
he was a licensed motor vehicle dealer?
A
No.
(R. 375.)

She later testified
. . . and at the point that I went to give him the
check for $6,375.00, he let me know that he was an RV
dealer, never did mention that he was a dealer, as such.
Q
dealer?

What did he say about being an RV

A
He said that because he was an RV
dealer, he could process it more cheaply and
that would save me on the taxes or license
fees.
(R. 379 (emphasis supplied).)

A reading of the entire context of

Mrs. Bloomer's comments provides more than adequate support for the
explicit finding that Kim Conover failed to disclose he was in the
business of repairing and selling automobiles.
Mr. Conover failed to disclose his intention to sell the Ford
Escort which he accepted as part of the purchase price, and instead
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told Plaintiff a story that he intended to use it for personal use.
Marilyn Bloomer testified that she was given trade in value for the
Escort because appellant indicated to her that it would attach to
the back of his motorhome and he could use it as an extra vehicle,
(R. 375.)

Yet Mr. Conover testified that he wanted the Escort

because university students would be prone to buy it.

(R. 412.)

Mr. Conover also testified that his intent to sell the Nissan
existed from the time he acquired it, which was contrary to his
statement to Plaintiff that he formed that intent later:
Q
A

Q
A

After you acquired this vehicle, did you
put it up for sale?
No. I had to get this vehicle repaired
before I could sell it.
It had been
damaged on the right side of the vehicle.
But upon completion of those repairs, you
did put it for sale; did you not?
Yeah. A couple of months afterwards, I
had been driving — my wife had been
using it for errands around town.

He then further indicated that he advertised vehicles in the paper
30-40% of the time.
Q
A

Q
A
Q
A

Is there a practice that you had followed
in your business in selling vehicles?
Yeah. Probably, oh 30, 40% of them. A
lot of time I have them pre-sold. This
particular vehicle, yes, I had advertised
it in the paper.
It wasn't uncommon at this time for you
to discuss in the paper and sell them by
that means; isn't that true?
No. It is not uncommon.
What telephone number did you use in the
advertisement?
I used my home telephone number, 9431114, area code 801.
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A careful reading of this testimony, coupled with the trial
court's discretion in crediting testimony, leaves one with the
definite impression and fair inference that Mr. Conover sold this
vehicle in the same manner as he sold other vehicles out of his
office.

His wife may have used the vehicle, but it is common for

dealers to make personal use of vehicles in their possession while
they are waiting to be sold.

Therefore, the trial court's

decision, that Mr. Conover was selling the vehicle as part of his
used car business, is supported by the evidence and not subject to
reversal.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED A LOSS BY REASON OF
DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
THE DEFECTIVE AND UNSAFE NATURE OF
THE VEHICLE.
Defendants claim that plaintiff is precluded from recovering
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, because she did not
suffer a loss. In support of their claim, defendants cite only the
evidence supporting defendants and contend that the vehicle had
passed two safety inspections, and that the damage could have been
caused by a "curb, gutter, chuckhole, any number of things."
(Defendants' Brief at p. 11.)

Defendants fail to acknowledge the

compelling contrary evidence, which amply supports the finding of
loss.
Defendants rely principally upon the testimony that the damage
could have been caused by hitting a curb, chuckhole, etc.
21

An

initial failing of this claim is that Marilyn Bloomer testified
that she never hit any curb, chuckhole, or other similar obstruction.

(R. 551.) A second infirmity with the argument is that the

problems became apparent only a few months after purchase.

Mrs.

Bloomer testified that about six months after purchasing the
vehicle, it began to tug slightly to one side.

Her husband drove

it briefly at this time and told her that it badly needed a wheel
alignment.

(R. 381-82.)

Finally, Ed Jensen, an auto body expert,

testified that there was no evidence that the vehicle had ever
struck a curb or other obstruction with sufficient force to do any
damage, and further testified that there were no signs of any
damage to the vehicle other than the

initial

performed at the request of Kim Conover.

frame repairs

(R. 481-82.)

This

testimony was corroborated by David Gray, who was responsible for
performing the initial repairs.

He testified that hitting a curb

or chuckhole would likely have caused additional damage to the
frame because the frame had lost its strength in the initial
collision and had not been properly repaired.

(R. 490.)

Defendants also claim that the fact the vehicle passed two
safety

inspections shows that it was safe when Mrs. Bloomer

purchased it and that the problems did not arise until after the
second inspection.

Defendants did not present any evidence,

however, concerning the competency of the persons who performed the
inspections.

(R. 521.)

The testimony to the effect that the

vehicle would

not have passed
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an

inspection

in the damaged

condition was contingent upon the inspection being performed
properly by a competent inspector.

(R. 528-29, 534-35, 544.)

The trial court specifically found that the structural damage
to the vehicle was caused prior to the time Mrs. Bloomer purchased
it, and that the damage existed at the time of her purchase.
306-08.)

(R.

This finding is supported by the evidence and must

therefore be affirmed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN CRAFTING A FAIR
AND EQUITABLE DECREE.
Plaintiffs

Second Amended

Complaint sought an award of

damages, or "such other and further relief as may appear just and
equitable in the premises."

(R. 120.) The trial court declined to

enter an award of damages, but instead held that the suit was in
the nature of fraud and that the appropriate remedy was rescission.
Defendants do not challenge that rescission is an appropriate
remedy for fraud, but claim instead that rescission is not a
permissible remedy under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, and
further, that the decree of rescission did not give proper credit
for the use plaintiff had made of the vehicle. Both claims should
be rejected by this court.
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act does, as argued by
defendants, provide that a consumer who suffers damage from a
violation of the Act may be awarded damages. Utah Code Ann. § 1311-19(2) (1986).

The Act also provides, however, that
23

M

[t]he

remedies

of this Act

are

in addition

to remedies

otherwise

available for the same conduct under state or local law . . . . M
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-23 (1986).
remedy for fraud under Utah law.
1247 (Utah 1980) ("Dugan I").

Rescission is an appropriate
Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239,

Although rescission was not the

primary relief plaintiff requested, plaintiff had requested that
the court order such other relief as was appropriate.

The court

did not abuse its discretion in determining that rescission was the
appropriate remedy in this case.
Defendants also claim that the decree of rescission improperly
failed to return the parties to the status quo ante. Specifically,
defendants claim that they were entitled to an offset for the use
plaintiff made of the vehicle.
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the general proposition that
" [t]o rescind a partially executed contract, the party seeking
rescission usually must be able to place the other party in the
same position that existed before the execution of the contract."
50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
City. 784 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
Supreme Court has also observed, however, as follows:
The rule that the rescinding party must restore the opposing party to the status quo
is not a technical rule, but rather
it is equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of
the parties.
How this is to be
accomplished, or indeed whether it
can, is a matter which is within the
discretion of the trial court under
24

The Utah

the facts as found to exist by the
trier of fact.
Duaan v. Jones, 724 P. 2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986) ("Dugan II") (quoting
Smith v. Huber. 666 P.2d 1122 (Colo. App. 1983)).
In Duaan II, the buyers claimed fraud in the sale of real
property

and

stopped

making payments.

The sellers sued to

foreclose the note and mortgage executed by the buyers, and the
buyers counterclaimed for fraud.

The buyers ultimately abandoned

the premises, and the sellers retook possession.

The trial court

awarded the buyers judgment for the payments they had made on the
contract, but did not award any interest.

The court denied the

sellers7 request for an offset for the reasonable rental value of
the property while the buyers were in possession.

The sellers

appealed asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred
in failing to award sellers the reasonable rental value of the
property.

The Utah Supreme Court held:
While assigning error to the trial
court's failure to award them rent, plaintiffs
fail to acknowledge that the court also disallowed defendants interest on payments made on
the purchase price for the period before
rescission on the expressly stated ground that
defendants had the use and possession of the
property, although plaintiffs had the use of
defendants' money. That finding itself implies that the trial court did in fact compensate plaintiffs for the loss of use and possession of their property.
Since it was
difficult to arrive at a fair rental value,
given the limited use value of the store and
the sparsely populated area where the store
was located, that financial adjustment seems
eminently fair and equitable.

Dugan II, 724 P.2d at 957.
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Of similar effect is the case of Forsythe v. Elkins, 216 Mont.
108, 700 P.2d 596 (1985).

This case was cited approvingly by the

Utah Supreme Court in Dugan II. 724 P.2d at 957, as an example of
an exception to the general rule that the parties be restored to
the status quo. The plaintiffs in that action entered into an oral
agreement to jointly purchase property with the defendants.

Part

of the agreement was that each would be able to occupy trailer
residences on the property.

The defendants later breached the

agreement, and the plaintiffs sued for rescission. The trial court
rejected the rescission claim because the plaintiffs had not
tendered their return of their interest in the property and had
remained in occupancy of the property, but held that plaintiffs
were entitled to recover the principal portion of payments they had
made towards the property, subject to an offset to defendants for
the reasonable rental value of the plaintiffs' occupancy of the
property.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and held the plaintiffs
were entitled

to rescission.

The court held

that although

restoration to the status quo was generally required, "absolute and
literal restoration

is not required,

it being

sufficient if

restoration is such as is reasonably possible or as may be demanded
by the equities of the case."

700 P.2d at 601.

The court held

that under the equities of that case, the defendants should refund
all payments, both the principal and interest portions, made by the
plaintiffs, together with interest on those payments from the time
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of rescission, and further held that the defendants were not
entitled to any credit for the plaintiffs7
premises up to the time of rescission.

occupancy of the

Id.

The trial courts decision in the instant case was likewise
fair under the particular equities of this case.

The trial court

awarded plaintiff judgment against defendants for all payments
plaintiff had made for the purchase of the automobile and ordered
plaintiff to return the automobile to defendants in its present
condition. Although the court did not make any adjustment for the
use plaintiff had made of the automobile, the court likewise did
not require defendants to compensate plaintiff for the many dollars
she spent in attempting to repair the vehicle and for the six new
tires she put on the vehicle.

Plaintiff testified that problems

with the vehicle started about six months after she purchased it,
and continued for the remainder of the time she had the vehicle.
It was well within the trial court's discretion to conclude that
any benefit plaintiff received from use of the defective and
troublesome vehicle was offset by the money she paid in attempting
to have the vehicle repaired.

It cannot be said that the trial

court abused its discretion under the equities of this case.
POINT IV
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD WAS WITHIN
THE COURT'S DISCRETION.
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth several alternative theories
under which plaintiff was entitled to relief and sought an award of
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damages under each claim.

The trial court rejected some of the

theories but awarded damages for the violation of the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act.

Defendants now make the novel argument that

because some of the alternative theories were not successful,
plaintiff was required to allocate her attorney fees to each
individual claim for relief.
Defendants have set forth no law nor meaningful argument in
support of their claim. The Utah appellate courts have consistently held that an appellate court will not reach the merits of a
claim which is not supported by adequate legal analysis and case
citations.

The courts have declined to rule on issues where the

party's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support
[the] argument," stating that "Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court requires that the argument section of a brief
'contain the contentions of the [party] with respect to the issues
presented and the reasons therefor, with citations . . . .
must contain some support for each contention."

A brief

State v. Wareham,

772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)5 (quoting State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
See also State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(where defendant provided no analysis, citation to the record, or
citation to case authority, the court would not reach substantive
claim).

As in Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct.

5

Wareham relies on a previous version of Rule 24(a)(9) which
is substantially the same as the current version of the Rule.)
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App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990), this Court should not
"consider conclusory arguments without citation to either the
record or cases involving pivotal issues."
If the court does decide to address the merits of defendants'
claim, the claim should nonetheless be rejected.

Utah Code Ann. §

13-11-19 authorizes an award of reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing

party

if

"an action under

this

section has been

terminated by a judgment or required by the court to be settled
under

Section

13-11-21(1)(a)

[relating

to

class

actions]."

Plaintiff brought an action under § 13-11-19 and prevailed in that
action, and the action was terminated by a judgment.

Plaintiff is

accordingly entitled to her reasonable attorney fees reasonably
incurred in pursuing the action.
Plaintiff's counsel would have been derelict in his representation of plaintiff if he had not alleged all possible theories
under which plaintiff could recover.

Pursuing each of those

theories was part of the "work reasonably performed" in pursuit of
the action under the Consumer Sales Practices Act. Defendants have
failed to show where the trial court abused its discretion in
making the award.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL.
Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 13-11-19(5) (1986).

Where attorney fees were awarded
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below, they should similarly be awarded on appeal.

Management

Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980).
The burden is on defendants to show a reason to depart from this
general rule. Watson v. Watson, Case No. 910223-CA, 1992 WL 207682
(Utah Ct. App. Aug 24, 1992) . Defendants have not shown any reason
for departing from this general rule, and plaintiff is not aware of
any.
CONCLUSION
The evidence amply supports the trial court's findings.

The

equitable award crafted by the trial court was fair under the
circumstances of this case and within the court7s discretion. The
Judgment and Decree should be affirmed

in all respects, and

plaintiff should be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this

/v'~t*~

day of September, 1992.
RAY G. MARTINEAU

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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APPENDIX "A"
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

RAY G. MARTINEAU (#2105)
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-0200

Third Judicial District

r

JAN 2 3 i?92

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN J. BLOOMER,
Plaintiff,

i
I
]i

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
KIM EDWARD CONOVER; KIM
EDWARD CONOVER and KAREN JANE
CONOVER, a Utah General
Partnership dba K & K SALES;
]
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
a Corporation; and DAVID GRAY, ]
dba METAL CRAFT AUTO REPAIR,
]

Civil No. 890906666 CV
(Judge Scott Daniels)

Defendants.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial
before the court sitting without a jury on September 3, 1991 at
9:00 o'clock a.m. the plaintiff appearing in person and by and
through her attorney Ray G. Martineau, the defendant Kim Edward
Conover appearing in person and said defendant and the defendants Karen Jane Conovjr, K & K Sales and Western Surety
Company appearing by and through their attorney James L. Barker
Jr. and the defendant David Gray appearing in person pro se,
and the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and
-1-

having considered a number of written exhibits that were introduced into evidence and the Court having received the Affidavit
and Supplemental Affidavit of plaintiff's attorney regarding
his attorney's fees and costs expended on behalf of plaintiff,
and the defendants having filed their Motion For More Definite
Statement Re Attorneys Fees And Order Of Court To Require
Plaintiff, Insofar As Possible To Restore Defendant To Status
Quo, and plaintiff having filed her response thereto and the
defendant Kim Edward Conover having filed Defendant Kim Edward
Conover's Objection To Plaintiff's Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law And Judgment And Reply To Plaintiff's
Response To Defendant's Motion Re Attorney's Fees And Returning
Parties To Status Quo and the Court having heretofore made and
entered its Order Vacating Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of
Law And Judgment herein and the Court having heard and considered the arguments, statements and stipulations of counsel
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefor hereby makes and enters the following
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is now and at all material times herein

has been a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant Kim Edward Conover ("Conover") is now

and at all material times herein has been a "supplier" under
-2-

,1M9SC;

the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act")
and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendant K & K Sales ("K & K Sales") is a Utah

General Partnership, consisting of Kim Edward Conover and Karen
Jane Conover as its general partners, that was at all material
times herein a duly licensed Motor Vehicle Dealer under and
pursuant to the Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act"),
Title 41, Utah Code Ann., and a "supplier" under the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act"), Title 13,
Chapter 11, Utah Code Ann. (1987), whose principal office and
place of business in now and at all material times herein has
been located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Western Surety Company ("Western") is a

corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the State of South Dakota who at all material times
herein has been duly authorized to transact, and who has in
fact at all material times herein transacted, business as a
surety company in the State of Utah.
5.

Defendant David Gray ("Gray") is now and at all

material times herein has been a resident of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah who at all material times herein transacted business under the assumed*, fictitious and unregistered name of
Metaicraft Auto Repair.
6.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of and par-
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ties to this action is properly vested and exists in this Court
pursuant to the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 3, Utah Code
Ann. (1986).
7.

Venue of this action properly rests in this Court

pursuant to the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 13, Utah Code
Ann. (1953).
8.

As a material and essential requirement for the

issuance and continued validity of the license of K & K Sales
to act as a Motor Vehicle Dealer under and pursuant to the
Motor Vehicle Act, K & K Sales was required, pursuant to the
provision of Section 41-3-16 of the Motor Vehicle Act, to post
a certain Bond of Motor Vehicle Dealer (Bond No, 58270937)
issued by Western in the penal sum of $20,000.00, which bond
was in full force and effect at all material times herein.
9.

On or about October 12, 1987 K & K Sales acquired

that certain 1986 Nissan Stanza motor vehicle, VIN
JN8HM05Y5GX005738 ("Subject Vehicle"), from Western Affiliated
Salvage ("Affiliated") and in connection therewith Affiliated
advised K & K Sales, and K & K Sales became fully aware, and
was charged with full notice, of the fact that the Subject
Vehicle had been severely damaged in an automobile accident to
such an extent that tile Subject Vehicle had been acquired by
Affiliated as a salvage vehicle.
10.

Subsequent to October 12, 1987 K & K Sales made
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or caused to be made certain repairs to the Subject Vehicle.
11.

On or about April 19, 1988 K & K Sales, acting

through Conover as its duly authorized agent, sold and conveyed
the Subject Vehicle to plaintiff and in connection therewith K
& K Sales and Conover, with intent to deceive plaintiff, represented to plaintiff that the Subject Vehicle was a low mileage
vehicle, that it had been repaired following an accident in
which it had been involved whereby it had only sustained damage
to one of its front fenders, that the Subject Vehicle was in
good condition and state of repair, that it could be operated
safely and that it was reasonably .fit and fully operable for
its intended use,
12.

At the time K & K Sales and Conover sold the

Sxibject Vehicle to plaintiff, K & K Sales and Conover knew and
were charged with full knowledge (a) that the Subject Vehicle
had sustained severe structural damage in the aforementioned
accident, (b) that unless such damage had been properly and
professionally repaired the Subject Vehicle could not be
operated safely and without the same constituting a severe
hazard to its operator and the public at large, and (c) that
the value of the Subject Vehicle, if not properly so repaired,
would be but a fraction of the value the Subject Vehicle had
the aforementioned representations been true.
13.

Plaintiff, in reasonably and foreseeable reliance
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upon the aforementioned representations and without knowledge
of their falsity, purchased the Subject Vehicle.
14.

Subsequent to plaintiff*s purchase of the Subject

Vehicle, plaintiff learned and became aware of the fact that
K & K Sales and Conover had made or caused to be made certain
repairs to the Subject Vehicle.
15.

The aforementioned acts and breaches of duty on

the part of K & K Sales and Conover constituted deceptive and
unconscionable acts and practices under Section 13-11-4 and
13-11-5 of the Sales Practices Act.
16.

As a proximate and foreseeable consequence of the

aforementioned acts and breaches of duty on the part of K & K
Sales and Conover, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to
suffer recoverable actual damages in the amount of $7,175.00
which plaintiff is entitled to recover ~rom K & K Sales and
Conover, and each of them, in this proceeding, together with
plaintiff's costs in the amount of $ 450.00 and attorney1s fees
in the amount of $ 9,500.00, which plaintiff is entitled to
recover from K & K Sales and Conover, and each of them, in this
proceeding.
17.

Western |s liable to plaintiff under and pursuant

to the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Sales Practices
Act and the aforementioned Bond for any and ail sums for which
plaintiff is awarded judgment herein against K & K Sales and
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Conover, or any of them, including costs and attorney1s fees.
18.

The defendants Kim Edward Conover and K & K Sales

did not violate the Federal Act.
19.

The defendant David Gray did not violate the pro-

visions of the Federal Act, the Motor Vehicle Act or the Sales
Practices Act.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Jurisdiction over the parties to and subject

matter of these proceedings is properly vested in this Court
and the venue of this action properly rests in this Court.
2.

In connection with the sale of the Subject

Vehicle to plaintiff, defendants Kim Edward Conover and K & K
Sales, violated the provisions of the Sales Practices Act with
the "intent to deceive" plaintiff.
3.

The most appropriate remedy in these proceedings

is in the equitable nature of rescission whereby plaintiff
should be awarded judgment against the defendants, and each of
them, for the sum of $7,175,00 together with plaintiff costs in

1

the amount of $ 450.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of
$ 9,500.00, and whereby the plaintiff should be ordered to
deliver the Subject Vehicle in its present condition, together
with the title thereto to K & K Sales upon the payment and
-7-

satisfaction of the sums that are due to her as hereinabove
stated.
4.

Plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive

damages as against the defendants.
5.

Defendant David Gray is entitled to a dismissal

with prejudice of all claims that have been asserted against
him in this proceeding.
DATED this

day of January, 1992,

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law was served
upon the following named individuals by hand delivering a copy
thereof, at the address shown below this 3) \
December, 1991:

James L. Barker, Jr.
2 452 Emearson Avenue
Salt Lai& City, Utah 84108

day of

APPENDIX "B"
Amended Judgment

RAY G. MARTINEAU (#2105)
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 34106
Telephone: (801) 486-0200

'JAN 2 3 »92

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN J. BLOOMER.AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIM EDWARD CONOVER; KIM
EDWARD CONOVER and KAREN JANE
CONOVER, a Utah General
Partnership dba K & K SALES;
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
a Corporation; and DAVID GRAY,
dba METAL CRAFT AUTO REPAIR,

I

'-a \ U W ^
Civil No. 890906666 CV
(Judge Scott Daniels)

Defendants.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial
before the court sitting without a jury on September 3, 1991 at
9:00 o'clock a.m. the plaintiff appearing in person and by and
through her attorney Ray G. Martineau, the defendant Kim Edward
Conover appearing in person and said defendant and the defendants Karen Jane Conover, K & K Sales and Western Surety
Company appearing by and through their attorney James L. Barker
Jr. and the defendant David Gray appearing in person pro se,
and the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and

having considered a number of written exhibits that were introduced into evidence and the Court having received the Affidavit
and Supplemental Affidavit of plaintiff's attorney regarding
his attorney's fees and costs rendered and incurred on behalf
of plaintiff, and the defendants having filed their Motion For
More Definite Statement Re Attorneys Fees And Order Of Court To
Require Plaintiff, Insofar As Possible To Restore Defendant To
Status Quo and Defendant Kim Edward Conovers Objection To
Plaintiff's Findings Of Act And Conclusions Of Law And
Judgment, and Reply to Plaintiff's Response To Defendant's
Motion Re Attorney's Fees And Returning Parties To Status Quo
and the Court having heretofore made and entered its Order
Vacating Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and Judgment
herein, and the Court having heard and considered the arguments, statements and stipulations of counsel and being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor and
the Court having heretofore entered its Amended Findings of.
Fact and Conclusions of Law herein.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment against the defendants Kim Edward Conover, Kim Edward Conover and Karen Jane
Conover a Utah General Partnership dba K & K Sales, and Western
Surety Company, and each of them, for the sum of $7,175.00
together with costs in the amount of $ 450.00 and attorney's
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fees in the amount of $ 9,-500.00.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDER,. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
upon the payment and satisfaction in full of the sums due
plaintiff as above provided, plaintiff shall deliver the motor
vehicle that is the subject of these proceedings in its present
condition together with the title thereto to the defendant K &
K Sales.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that all claims asserted against the defendant David Gray in
the above entitled proceedings may be and the same are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT
BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY
AFFIDAVIT."
DATED this

7^

day of January, 1992.

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended Judgment was served upon the following named
individual by hand delivering a copy thereof, at the address
shown below this O 1 day of December, 1991:

James L. Barker, Jr.
2452 Emerson Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

H
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APPENDIX "C"
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (Supp. 1992)

13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier.
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier m connection with a consumer
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier, with intent to deceive.
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits,
if it has not,
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not,
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different
from the fact;
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to
the consumer for a reason that does not exist,
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied m accordance with a previous representation, if it has not;
(£) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied
in greater quantity than the supplier intends;
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
d) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation
he does not have,
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false;
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other
benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in
return for giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers or
otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions,
if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the
consumer enters into the transaction,
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods
or furnish the services within the time advertised or otherwise represented or. if no specific time is advertised or represented, fails to ship the
goods or furnish the services withm 30 days, unless within the applicable
time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to either
cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments
to the supplier or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed
by the supplier, but any refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer
within ten business days after the seller receives written notification
from the buyer of the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement and
receive the refund,
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct
solicitation sale within three business days at the time of purchase if the
sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business
pursuant to the supplier's mail, telephone, or personal contact and if the
sale price exceeds $25, which notice shall be a conspicuous statement
written in bold type, m immediate proximity to the space reserved for the
signature of the buyer, as follows- "YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL
THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE
THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION ",
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as
defined under Title 76, Chapter 6a; or
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed m response to a
charitable solicitation will be donated or used for a particular purpose or
will be donated to or used by a particular organization, if the representation is false

APPENDIX "D"
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (1986)

13-11-19. Actions by consumer.
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this
chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who
has violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter.
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is
greater, plus court costs.
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an
adequate remedy at law, he may bring a class action for declaratory judgment,
an injunction, and appropriate ancillary relief against an act or practice that
violates this chapter.
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter
may bring a class action for the actual damages caused by an act or
practice specified as violating this chapter by a rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Section [Subsection] 13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate
§ 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a final judgment of the appropriate court or courts
of general jurisdiction and appellate courts of this state that was either
officially reported or made available for public dissemination under Section [Subsection] 13-ll-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority ten days before
the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or with respect to
a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a
consent judgment which became final before the consumer transactions
on which the action is based.
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a
supplier and the damages can be computed with reasonable certainty,
damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot be located with
due diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to the
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in which the
supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation.
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work
reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or
a supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or
required by the court to be settled under Section [Subsection]
13-ll-21(l)(a).
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final
judgment in favor of the enforcing authority under § 13-11-17 is admissible as
prima facie evidence of the facts on which it is based in later proceedings
under this section against the same person or a person in privity with him.
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party
shall mail a copy to the enforcing authority for inclusion in the public file
maintained under Section [Subsection] 13-ll-7(l)(e).
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two years after
occurrence of a violation of this chapter, or within one year after the termination of proceedings by the enforcing authority with respect to a violation of
this chapter, whichever is later. When a supplier sues a consumer, he may
assert as a counterclaim any claim under this chapter arisin«r mit nf +fc<*

